

**Plea Bargain Law and the Fight Against Corruption in
Nigeria: Between Punishment and Protection**

By

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Abstract

Corruption is endemic and it occurred virtually in all the facets of Nigerian life. Consequently, the inability of the plea bargain law to fight corruption holistically in order to enforce deterrence had resulted in increased corrupt cases as corrupt officials escaped commensurate punishment for their offences. It is against this backdrop that the paper examined the effectiveness of the plea bargain law in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The study adopted a qualitative descriptive research design to present its collated data. Unlike previous studies, the study argued that plea bargain law has become a shield for corrupt public officials and that the fight against corruption in Nigeria was selective as many alleged officials were exonerated. The study thus recommended that the 1999 Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution be amended as soon as possible to remove the clause that supported plea bargaining in order to allow for harsher and more stringent punishment laws. It also suggested that the anti-corruption agencies be given the authority to be truly independent in order to resist selective arrest and prosecution of corrupt officials.

Keywords: Plea, bargain, law, Nigeria, corruption

INTRODUCTION

One of the challenges associated with the fight against corruption in Nigeria is the flexibility of the law in sanctioning corrupt public officials. The application and implementation of plea bargain law to sought for clemency for offenders in corruption charges has been a source of concerns to well-meaning and patriotic Nigerians who felt plea bargain law protects corrupt public officials rather than punishing them. This type of law is not only contradictory but also ironical for a country like Nigeria that has been grossly ravaged by the endemic corrupt practices.

The plea bargain is a constitutionally backed arrangement that allowed defendant and the prosecution to work out mutually beneficial agreement to both parties. In the agreement, the defendant plead guilty to attract a more lenient sentence while the prosecutor enjoys speedy trial and recovery of resources in

corruption cases. In Nigeria, Section 270 of 1999 constitution as amended supported plea bargain in criminal matters.

Unfortunately, this provision has been exploited adversely by public office holders who have hidden under the guise to loot public treasury and abuse power. Since the introduction and subsequent implementation of the plea bargain law in Nigeria, corrupt cases seem to be on the increase with many politicians cum top civil servants having one case or the other to answer relating to corruption.

Corruption is a nebulous concept in literature hence its dimension and complexity still need to be conceptualized to suit specific purpose of discussion (Sulaiman and Olowu, 2022). Also, Umar and Ereke (2012) while describing the complexity surrounding the concept believe corruption is a paradox as well as a riddle: most people have an idea of what it is, but do not necessarily share the same idea, perhaps because

it is widespread in coverage, the concept attracts different meanings from different people sometimes these meanings given to the concept of corruption are competing and even conflictual. In the paper, corruption as a reflection of abuse of office, mismanage of public fund and outright embezzlement of public fund by public officials suits the discourse of the study.

Undoubtedly, corruption is ubiquitous but the prevalence and pervasive nature of it in developing countries has attracted successive governments and other stakeholders' concern. Corrupt activity cuts across borders and instances abound globally. In Germany, Siemens corruption came to mind, in Peru, the Fujimori's embezzlement was a reference, Kadyrov's Chechnya bribes, Ben Ali corruption in Tunisia, Victor Yanukovych corruption in Ukraine, Ricardo Martinelli's corrupt activity in Panama Najib Rasak embezzlement in Malaysia, Francisco Correa's corrupt role in Spain, Sani

Abacha stupendous theft in Nigeria are few evidence of global nature of corruption (Transparent International, 2019).

But in a country like Nigeria with N42.84 trillion (USD103.31 billion) debt profile as of 30 June, 2022 (Debt Management Office, 2022), a situation that has resulted into gargantuan debt servicing which exceeds the total revenue generated annually, in a country that has more than 20million out of school children according to UNESCO reports (Premium Times, 2022), with 23 million unemployed and 76 million adult illiterates (Tribuneonline, 2021), superfluous and wastefulness should attract serious punishment. Stolen funds in Nigeria would if recovered would have gone a long way in checkmating the fight against intractable insurgents and insecurity that has been on for more than a decade, the funds would have been utilized to stabilize the country's knowledge industry (public universities) where solutions to all societal ills

are expected to be proffered but crippled by strike over money related issues.

The need to be strict on the fight against corruption and recover looted funds in Nigeria becomes quintessentially important going by the dwindling oil revenue and gross financial mismanagement. The following issues are addressed in the paper: Has Nigeria's plea-bargain law been successful and efficient in battling corruption? Has the implementation of plea-bargain law resulted in deterring public office holders against corruption in Nigeria?

PLEA BARGAIN

A plea bargain is a negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty or no contest to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges. It is

also termed plea agreement, negotiated plea; sentence bargain (Garner, 2014). In other words, plea bargain is entered into for the sake of clemency from an offence(s) which defendant pleads guilty for. In this sense, plea bargain is seen as a leverage to get lesser punishment of an alleged offence.

But in Adekunle (2015) view, plea bargain is one of the tools employed in the criminal justice system. It helps the court and State to manage caseloads. In other words, Adekunle (2015) sees plea bargain as a tool with advantages and benefits to both the state and the courts. Although in the Administration Criminal Justice Act ACJA (2015), the discretion to accept a plea bargain lies with the prosecutor. there are certain guidelines to prevent abuse especially as to what the prosecutor must consider before entering a plea bargain with the accused. Unlike Garner (2014), Adekunle (2015) emphasizes on the advantages derived in employing plea bargain and sees it as a tool of criminal justice.

Section 494 (1) of the Administration Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) defines plea bargain as the process in criminal proceedings whereby the defendant and the prosecutor work out a mutually acceptable disposition of the case; including the plea of the defendant to a lesser offence than that charged in the complaint or information and in conformity with other conditions imposed by the prosecution, in return for a lighter sentence than that for the higher charge subject to the Court's approval. The Section 494 (1) of the Administration Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) explanation was detail as it specified the role of participants in the process of plea bargain as well the benefits attached to such agreement.

We conclude that plea bargain is a constitutionally backed arrangement that allowed defendant and the prosecutor to work out mutually beneficial agreement for both parties in a case, usually criminal. In the agreement, the defendant plead guilty

to attract a more lenient sentence while the prosecutor enjoys speedy trial and recovery of resources in corruption cases.

PLEA BARGAIN TYPES

There are various kinds of plea agreements. Charge bargaining, sentence negotiating, express bargaining, and implicit bargaining are among the forms noted.

Charge Bargain: When the prosecutor enables a defendant to plead guilty to a reduced charge or to only some of the counts brought against him, this is known as a charge bargain. For instance, a prosecutor might agree to a guilty plea to manslaughter in exchange for dropping the murder charge.

Sentence Bargain: Defendant is informed in advance of the punishment he would get if he entered a guilty plea in a sentence bargain. For instance, if the offender is being held on significant accusations and is concerned about receiving the harshest punishment possible. Only sentences that have been

approved by the trial judge may be served (<https://legalpediaonline.com/plea-bargain/>).

Express bargaining: occurs when a defendant or his attorney actively discusses the potential rewards of entering a plea of guilty with a prosecutor or a trial judge.

Implicit bargaining: nevertheless, does not include face-to-face conversations. Implicit bargaining occurs when trial judges, in particular, develop a pattern of treating defendants who enter guilty pleas more leniently than defendants who exercise their right to a trial. As a result, defendants come to expect that entering guilty pleas will result in favorable treatment (<https://legalpediaonline.com/plea-bargain/>).

FACTORS TO CONSIDER BEFORE OFFERING OR ACCEPTING PLEA BARGAIN

Justice is at the heart of plea bargain, hence the acceptance or offer of plea bargain by the prosecutor must be motivated by the desire for justice. Section 270 (3) provides:

Where the prosecutor is of the view that the offer or acceptance of a plea bargain is in the interest of justice, the public interest, public policy, and the need to prevent abuse of legal process, he may offer or accept the plea bargain. Thus, plea bargain is not offered or accepted with a view of giving defendants a slap on the wrist or to mock the administration of criminal justice. Specifically, the provision states that abuse of legal process is to be prevented. This is reinforced by the provision of section 270 (5) which enumerates factors that the prosecutor is to consider before concluding that requirement of subsection (3) has been met. Such factors include:

- i. consultation with the victim
- ii. his representative
- iii. the police in charge of investigating the case
- iv. the nature and circumstances relating to the offence
- v. the defendant and.
- vi. public interest.

If the list were a product of the 1st Respondent, then he can question or challenge them on dates of acquisition. He is a man of rational thinking who willingly gave the list of properties he is forfeiting. He cannot turn round to allege that some of those properties were obtained before the commission of the offence (Nigeria Institute of Advance Legal Studies NIALS,2020).

PROCEDURE FOR PLEA BARGAIN UNDER THE ACJA 2015

The 2015 Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) requires that any agreement between the parties specified in

sub-section (3) be converted to writing and contain the complete text of the following:

(a) The defendant has been made aware of the following things before the agreement is finalized: I his right to remain silent; (ii) the penalties of speaking up; and (iii) the fact that he is under no obligation to make any confessions or admissions that might be used against him as evidence.

Be signed by the prosecutor, the defendant, the attorney, and the translator, as applicable. (b) Clearly describe the conditions of the agreement and any admissions made.

(d) The Attorney-General of the Federation will receive a copy of the contract that the parties to subsection (6) of this section have signed in paragraph (c).

The conversations may not be attended by the presiding Judge or Magistrate. In cases where the parties reach an agreement, the prosecutor is required to inform the court of that arrangement. The duty rests with the sitting Judge. The

presiding judge or magistrate must inform the defendant of the sentence or reject their plea if they consider that the crime requires a more severe punishment than what was previously agreed upon. The alternative is for the defendant to maintain their guilty plea and take the punishment. If that happens, a new judge or magistrate will preside over the trial (NIALS,2020).

CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION

Scanlon (2004) aptly captures the dilemma of conceptualizing corruption when he argues that corruption is like the nature and appearance of the elephant: everyone knows (or thinks they know) what it is but may find it difficult to define with precision.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank define corruption as the abuse of public office through the instrumentality of private agents, who actively offer bribes to

circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit (IMF, 2017). This conception is limited in that corruption goes beyond bribery and public officials are involved in it and abuse office for personal benefit.

Corruption has also been viewed by Gaji(2006) in two broad dimensions: generic and official corruption. Generically corruption is said to be any dishonest or immoral behaviour that is at variance with generally accepted standards. For official corruption, two definitions are employed. The first is by the vision 2010 as all those “improper activities transactions that are aimed at changing the normal cause of events, judgments and trust”. The second, by Nwankwo (2003) which contends that corruption occurs when a person in a position of trust and responsibility, in defiance of prescribed norms, suppresses the rule to advance personal interests at the expense of public interest. This official conception of corruption by Nwankwo

(2003) suits the paper as majority of the corrupt Nigerians who have benefitted from the plea bargain law are public office holders who bend the rules to suit personal interest.

Corruption can be seen as any action or activity perpetrated by individual or group whether in government or private practice to violate and subvert the laid down rules and procedures in order to earn financial or undue influence that is personal.

Bearing this in mind, Mabogunje (2001) lists the items on the corruption index to include:

Bribery, nepotism, fraud, embezzlement, extortion, gratification, inflation of contracts, over-invoicing, abuse of tender process, awarding contract to self, payment for work or supplies not satisfactorily done or not done at all, proxies or favored ones; falsification and suppression of records, perversion of justice by law enforcement or judicial officers, smuggling, racketeering, adulteration of market goods, false

political promise, holding on to power against the will of the people, falsification of measures, abuse of office, rigging of census, electoral malpractice, examination malpractices, false declaration of assets, illegal acquisition of public property, misuse of public funds and deliberate delay of official files and other official transactions etc.

THEORY AND METHOD

Theory

The Low Risk/High Benefit hypothesis is used in this investigation. The low risk-high benefit theory is used as the study's theoretical framework, and this decision was motivated by the idea that deterrence is a proven strategy for effectively combating corruption (Ijewereme, 2015).

The low-risk, high-benefit hypothesis is similar to the deterrence concept. People won't be stopped from engaging in corruption if the punishment for unethical and corrupt behavior

is small, according to the theory (Ijewereme, 2013). However, if the punishment is harsh, public employees won't be as willing to engage in corruption and unethical behavior (Azelama, 2000).

Recent developments in high-profile cases involving corruption allegations reveal embarrassment in the use of plea bargaining. For instance, the conviction of Mr. John Yusuf, a former director of the police pensions office, along with six others, for misusing public funds (the police pension fund) totaling US\$203,726,708 (N32.8 billion) led to the explanation of the low risk, high reward theory in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. Yusuf received a light sentence of two years in prison with the option of a US\$4,658 (N750,000) fine, which he immediately offset (Aderele, 2013).

This kind of behavior not only demoralizes individuals who have painstakingly worked hard in the prosecution process, but it is also depressing. Comparatively speaking, Bernard

Lawrence Madoff, an American former businessman, stockbroker, investment adviser, and financier who pleaded guilty to 11 federal felonies for defrauding thousands of investors out of billions of dollars through his wealth management company's massive Ponzi scheme, received a 150-year prison sentence in America (Aderele, 2013).

The best place for bureaucratic corruption, however, is a country like Nigeria where people believe the risk of engaging in corrupt practices is low because it is simple to bribe law enforcement officials and avoid prosecution, while the gain is high because corrupt individuals profit greatly from corruption and enjoy unrestricted privileges in society. Public sector corruption is more common because public office holders can deceive the government and use their position to get it covered up (Ijewereme, 2015).

The lack of justice shown to powerful people who are accused or captured of corrupt practices escape justice with mere slap on the wrists through the porous instrumentality of plea bargaining which allows them to keep a part of the loot has increased the audacity to loot public treachery in Nigeria. the Low deterrent capacity that comes with the plea bargain law and the country's criminal justice system which slow the pace of trial with leniency of punishment has embolden public official to steal without remorse.

Methods

This study adopts qualitative descriptive research design as such, data are sourced through secondary method. Textbooks, journals, seminar papers, government publications, internet, media reports on corrupt public officials as well as court case reports provided useful and reliable data for the study. While some information was contextually presented with analytical

description, others are presented in tables for reader's ease and comprehension.

SELECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATION APPROACH IN CORRUPTION FIGHT

In Nigeria, there are unresolved cases of corruption. While some have dragged for years, other cases files are hidden or closed without public notice thus making mockery of the fight against corruption. For instance, during the 2019 elections, Adams Oshiomhole who was a former National Chairman of the All Progressive Congress APC carelessly and recklessly announced that those who joined the ruling party would have their "sins" forgiven. He encouraged more politicians in the opposition parties to toe the path of some members of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) who had defected to the APC (Saharareporters, 2021).

The table below shows some opposition party members who defected or joined the ruling party after they were alleged to

have embezzled, siphoned, diverted, and misappropriate government funds.

Selected Unresolved Allegation of Corruption against Public Office Holders

S/N	Name	Date of Defection	Allegation	State	Original Party	New Party
1	Governor David Umahi	November 2020	Diversion of N400 million into private pockets during the 2015 presidential election through an arms deal.	Ebonyi	Peoples Alliance PPA	Action Democratic Party ADP
2	Senator Godswill Akpabio	2018,	Accused of diverting over N100 billion from the oil-rich state between 2007 and 2015& N40 billion fraud in the Niger Delta Development Commission	Akwa Ibom	Peoples Democratic Party PDP	All Progressive Congress APC
3	Stella Oduah	August 27, 2021	Alleged involvement in over N9.4 billion fraud	Anambra	PDP	APC
4	Orji Uzor Kalu	November 2016.	Alleged money laundering N3.2 billion,	Abia	Peoples Democratic Party PDP	Peoples Democratic Party PDP
5	Adebayo Alao-Akala	2019	Accusations of an N11.5 billion along two others	Oyo	Peoples Democratic Party PDP	All Progressive Congress APC
6	Lt Gen Azubuike Ihejirika (retd.)	March 2021,	connected to the \$2.1 billion arms purchase probe involving the former National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki.	Abia	Peoples Democratic Party PDP	Peoples Democratic Party PDP
7	Joshua Dariye	September 2016	Diverting N1.126 billion from the Plateau State government's ecological fund	Plateau	PDP	PDP
8	Abdullahi Adamu	2010	Accused of embezzling N15 billion alongside 19 others.	Nasarawa	PDP	PDP

Source: Sulaiman and Olowu (2022)

Table shows Alleged Corrupt Public Office Holders who defected to the ruling party to stall or evade corruption

conviction. 5 high profile politicians including Governor David Umahi, Senator Godswill Akpabio, Stella Oduah, Joshua Dariye and Abdullahi Adamu defected from Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to ruling All Progressive Congress APC. Orji Uzor Kalu and Adebayo Alao-Akala defected from Progressive Peoples Alliance PPA Action Democratic Party ADP to All Progressive Congress APC respectively. Only Lt Gen Azubuike Ihejirika (retd.) joined the ruling party and not defected. Apart from Governor David Umahi who was alleged of Diverting of N400 million, others are accused of billions of naira.

SELECTED BENEFICIARIES OF PLEA BARGAIN LAW IN NIGERIA

The following individuals have benefitted from plea bargain Constitutional Arrangement and corrupt officials were let off the

S	Name	Offence	Amount	Amount	Sentence	Year
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/ N			nt Stolen / misappropriated	Recover/pro perty	/ Fine	r
1	Mr.Tafa Balogun, former Inspector-General of Police	Pleaded guilty to an updated eight-count corruption and money-laundering allegation.	N10 billion Naira	He forfeited much of the money.	Six months	2005
2	Former Bayelsa State Governor Governor Alamiyeseigha	Pleaded guilty to six count charge	N1.4 billion	\$400,000	2 years	2007
3	Governor Lucky Igbinedion, former Governor of Edo state	Pleaded guilty to a single count of misappropriation of public funds that had been amended.	N1,6 billion ,	Forfeited three landed properties to the Federal Government	A fine of N 3.5 million	2008
4	Cecilia Ibru,former Managing Director of Oceanic Bank	Pleaded guilty to a three-count charge of authorizing loans beyond her credit limit, rendering false accounts and approving loans without adequate collateral	Not stated	Forfeiture of related assets worth N191 billion	six months' imprisonment for each count, which ran concurrently	2010
5	Yusuf John	Pleaded guilty to a three-count	N32 billion	Forfeiture of assets	A fine of N750,00	2013

	Yakubu, former Assistant Director of the Police Pension Board.	modified charge of embezzling public funds.		acquired with the embezzled funds	0.00 (N250,000.00) for each count	
6	Jonah Otunla, Former Accountant General of the Federation	Pleaded guilty for money laundering	N2billion	N6.3billion	Not stated	2018
7	DikkoInde Abdullahi, also former Comptroller-General of Customs	Diversion of public fund,	N42 billion	N1.9 billion	Not stated	2016
8	Professor AdedibuOjerinde, former Registrar of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB)	Eighteen count charge allegations of diverting public fund	N5.2 billion	Allegedly filing for plea bargain	Case is still on	2022
9	Ahmed Idris, former Accountant General of the Federation	Alleged fourteen count charge bothering on theft, gratification etc.	N108 billion	Allegedly filing for plea bargain	Case is still on	2022

Source: compiled from various Newspaper Reports

The table shows selected public officials who have benefitted from the plea bargain law and those whose plea is still being process. While Tafa Balogun, Governor Alamiyeseigha, Governor Lucky Igbinedion, Cecilia Ibru and Yusuf John Yakubu pleaded guilty, forfeited money and properties to attract light sentence and fine, Jonah Otunla was alleged to have stolen 2billion but forfeited 6.2 billion in the cause of investigation. Jonah Otunla and DikkoInde Abdullahi's fine or sentence was not known or stated. AdedibuOjerinde and Ahmed Idris are allegedly filling for plea bargain as such their cases are still on.

A CRITIQUE OF PLEA BARGAIN LAW IN NIGERIA

Some people believe that the practice of plea bargaining was improperly implemented because the majority of the suspects who were permitted to enter their pleas were only making restitution for a small portion of the money they had stolen. Along with a host of other issues, opponents of the idea

contend that a plea agreement serves as insulation from punishment (Ani, 2022).

Following this submission, the aforementioned selected cases of beneficiaries of plea bargain law showed clearly that plea bargain is an excuse to evade justice from criminal offence such as corruption.

As it is being practiced in Nigeria, plea bargain encourages graft even more. A case of gross misappropriation that warrants death penalty in some countries are often accorded remission by plea bargain where the culprit walks the road unperturbed(Onyekwere, 2021). This practice does not only make mockery of the fight against corruption, but it also undermines, weaken, and frustrate the institutions which have committed resources and efforts in the prosecuting such celebrated criminals.

Plea bargain as it has been practiced and implemented in today's Nigeria exposes the too many lacunae in the country's constitution and its laws. Any constitution that provides escape route for corrupt public officials who plundered the state resources deserved to be amended to permit stiffer and strict laws that will prevent immunity to public officials from looting public funds. The lacuna created by Nigerian constitution according to Abubakar Malami, the federation's minister of justice and attorney general, who observed that *"the provision was inadequate to ensure the protection of public interest and prevent abuse. This lacuna is responsible for abuses in compounding of offences which had strengthened the current public skepticism about plea bargaining in general"* (Premium Times, 2021).

In Obijiofor (2022) opinion, *"plea bargain makes nonsense of the fight against corruption and other criminal activities"*. Beyond the question of plea bargaining, the trial of

Ojerinde and Ahmed Idris raises another important question about the conduct of high-profile citizens. Public officials or public servants who are appointed into positions of responsibility and abuse their high office must be punished severely. The penalty for corruption by public servants and ordinary citizens must be tough, punitive, and exemplary.

Does that mean plea bargain serve no good? Despite the unending criticism against the plea bargain law Onyekwere (2021) sees good omen in its adoption. According to him, plea bargain *"fast-tracks criminal trials and ensure that justice is done from a social obligation perspective and that plea bargain reduces the cost of criminal prosecution in most cases, it is a win-win arrangement amongst the prosecutor, the defendant, the court and also the general public."*

Onyekwere (2021) submission cannot hold water as special courts can be established to deal with accumulated corruption

cases to ensure speedy trial and the argument that plea bargain is a win-win arrangement is parochial. With the selected cases discussed above, the state (prosecutor) and the general public are the loser while the high profile corrupt public official (defendants) is the winner for keeping substantial part of the corruption proceeds after forfeiting negligible amount.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Earlier studies on plea bargain exposed the overwhelming advantages of the law as saw it as tool that will enhance Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria. Such conclusion was made by Adetomiwa (2018), in his work, he observed that the application of plea bargain in Nigeria certainly have positive impacts amidst the criticisms. While Ani (2021) submitted that the major problem with plea bargain was that its applications are in favor of the politically and economically powerful person rather than for the benefit of the

underprivileged and common offenders in Nigeria. Ted and Eze (2015) submitted in their work that plea bargain law cannot be applied in Nigeria because of its vulnerability to abuse.

The study argued that plea bargain law as it is presently practice in Nigeria serves as a shield to protect corrupt public officials by letting them off the hook to be sanctioned commensurately to their various corruption offences thus undermining the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The study also showed that the inability to sanction political exposed persons accordingly as a result of the leniency plea has embolden and encourage more corrupt practices in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The study has been able to demonstrate to a large extent that plea bargain was a protection tool for public officials who are being charged for corruption. The study observed that the plea bargain

law is like a shield from corrupt prosecution as many beneficiaries of the law got lenient sentence and forfeit negligible part of the corruption proceeds to state cover. The finding was in consonance with that of Onyekwere (2021) who concluded that plea bargain law made mockery of the fight against corruption and undermined, weakened, and frustrated the anti-corruption institutions efforts. Also, Ijewereme, (2015) views were in tandem with the study when he concluded that the risk of involving in corrupt practices in Nigeria is low.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, it is recommended that:

- i. It becomes necessary to amend all laws that allowed the current plea bargain arrangement as soon as possible and replace it with more severe and stringent punishments to dissuade prospective corrupt public officials. It is necessary to modify the

appropriate laws to serve the needs of the public rather than the criminal interests of a small-minded few because laws are made for men, not men for the law.

- ii. The incessant political interference from politicians and political parties in corruption trials should be discouraged. There is need for a truly autonomous and independent anti-corruption agencies to ensure holistic corruption fight.
- iii. There is need for strong ethical campaign as well as value remolding in Nigeria society. Where corrupt officials will be stigmatized to cohabit in the society and where from elementary stage of education pupils are taught the consequences of corruption.

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